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Abstract 
Many cooperatives are growing at an exceptional rate.  Cooperative growth has been 
fueled by producer consolidation, a highly competitive marketplace and new opportunities 
through rising global demand.  However, growth at an exceptional rate may be unsustainable and 
could potentially cause significant financial stress.  Cooperatives could get so caught up in 
growing that they could create problems, or “grow broke.”  The sustainable growth rate (SGR) is 
a financial metric used by many businesses to address this potential growth problem and can be 
used by cooperatives to ensure their long-run success.  Thus, the objective of this research is to 
better understand the SGRs of cooperatives, provide baseline SGRs, determine key attributes of 
higher growth rate cooperatives and key indicators of SGR changes. 
The SGR relates to the retained earnings growth of a cooperative.  Boosting a 
cooperative’s retained earnings can be done by manipulating the four levers of growth to attain 
higher retained earnings.  These financial decisions will also boost a firm’s SGR.  Increased 
retained earnings lends more flexibility to expand through organic growth or acquisitions. 
The SGR provides little information if not compared to actual growth results across time 
and across industry standards.  Actual growth rates are measured by the year-over-year change in 
sales as Higgins (1977) details.  By determining the difference between actual sales and the 
SGR, the sustainable growth challenge (SGC) is found.  The SGC is a straightforward way to see 
how far a firm is straying from the SGR and, over time, see where the correction was made to 
converge to the SGR.  If a business has a negative SGC, then actual growth rates exceeded SGR, 
which means outside financing is necessary to fund growth.  If SGC is positive, then the firm is 
not meeting their growth target and potentially not capturing their full value for their owners.  
(Higgins, 1977) 
  
A seemingly unrelated regression approach is used to analyze the interrelationships of the 
four levers of growth using panel data from the CoBank Risk Analyst database of Midwest 
cooperatives’ financial and operating information.  Breaking cooperatives into “large” and 
“small” designated groups will aids determining factors of boosted retained earnings.  The 
cooperatives are also grouped based on regional location as well as the percentage that farm 
supply sales make up total sales. The drivers of SGR in today’s cooperatives will be examined—
higher profit margin, or lower patronage—to determine which factors are more practical for 
specific cooperative size and type.  In addition, the size of cooperative that faces the largest SGC 
and whether that sector also has a higher or lower SGR is of interest to this research.  (“CoBank 
Risk Analyst Database,” 2017) 
Econometric results identify the most useful levers to boost the SGR, change the 
SGC or both.  Profit margin is the key driver of sustainable growth; however, operating 
efficiency and leverage are key factors as well.  When a growth challenge is present, 
leverage is most often used and the biggest contributor to changes in the SGC.  
Cooperatives of each size, location and region grow and are affected by growth challenges.  
This study will help cooperative directors understand the financial decision repercussions on 
growth and growth challenges.   
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
Since the 1922 Capper-Volstead Act was passed into law, cooperatives have been helping 
producers and rural communities thrive.  From this point forward, management decisions have 
led hundreds of cooperatives to regional or national success and led more yet to disastrous ruins.  
In 2015, the USDA reports that over 2,200 agriculturally focused cooperatives generated revenue 
in excess of $222 billion.  With such an impact on rural America, ensuring long-term success of 
these cooperatives helps safeguard success of U.S. producers.  Given the role that cooperative 
decision-making plays, education focused on planning, business management and outreach has 
proven crucial for cooperative success.   
Grain and farm supply cooperatives’ impact, through direct contributions as well as 
wages, on rural communities is tremendous.  These cooperatives held $40.5 billion equity in an 
$88.2 billion asset base and employed over 187,000 people, largely in rural communities, to meet 
the needs of their members.  Given cooperatives represent such large revenues and employment 
opportunities in agricultural and rural communities, understanding growth is key to longevity of 
such a vital business in rural America.  Cooperative management is oftentimes credited with the 
successes or failures of a cooperative.  Using sustainable growth rates and challenges in business 
plans aide management in decision making for long term success through matching of actual and 
sustainable growth rates.  (USDA, 2015)  
This study focuses on methods used by cooperatives for growth and how growth affects 
the financial underpinnings of a cooperative.  When a cooperative idolizes growth, the financials 
suffer due, in part, to growth swing induced leverage and operating efficiency changes.  
Likewise, when growth and the financials are thought of as having equal weight, the cooperative 
can more accurately predict how a purchase or expansion decision will affect short and long-term 
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health of the cooperative.  Accommodating members’ speed and efficiency needs could be a 
reason for expansion, upgrade or growth.  Cooperative growth and expansion may not be 
necessary if a cooperative is serving members’ needs and best interests with a healthy balance 
sheet. 
Monitoring growth via the sustainable growth rate (SGR) model is done through 
examining four key financial ratios – earnings retention, leverage, profit margin, and operating 
efficiency. Each of these ratios positively impacts the SGR, and if examined carefully, can show 
opportunities for improvement and challenges.  Cooperative directors and management can view 
these four ratios as “levers” that can be adjusted to drive growth.   
Cooperative growth can be a method for them to stay competitive in the fast-changing 
marketplace on the local, regional or national scale.  This study determines which growth levers 
best boost sustainable growth or best change the sustainable growth challenge (SGC).  Profit 
margin looks to be the key driver of sustainable growth; however, operating efficiency and 
leverage are key factors as well.  When a growth challenge is present, leverage is most often 
used and the biggest contributor to changes in the SGC.   
Due to the tremendous data available for the study, cooperative growth is tracked from 
1996 to 2014.  This study period spans double digit growth and decline of cooperatives.  The 
Farmland Industries bankruptcy of the early 2000s as well as the ethanol fueled commodity 
boom late in the same decade were major contributors to this varied growth.  Given the wide 
array of production and profitability results, the study provides robust findings that are 
immediately applicable to cooperative growth decision making.   
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The data used for calculating the SGR and SGC of cooperatives is from the CoBank Risk 
Analyst database.  The 19 years of data provides a look at cooperatives in all stages of growth.  
All cooperatives in the dataset persist throughout the study period.  With cooperatives in the 
dataset representing 23 states, localized or regionalized events will not affect the study.  Each 
cooperative’s panel data provides 19 years of observations for 155 variables. 
Due to the robust dataset, studying the aggregate methods of overcoming growth 
challenges may not be applicable to all cooperatives.  This study breaks the dataset into subsets 
for comparison and applicability of the results.  The categorization is done based on size, 
regional location, and whether a cooperative specializes in farm supply sales.  An analysis of the 
aggregate dataset allows for comparing subsets to the aggregate. 
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Chapter 2 - Literature Review 
Cooperatives exist as a vehicle for members to compete on a larger scale by pooling 
assets and production capacities.  Likewise, growth, expansion and acquisition by a cooperative 
is generally thought of as accomplishing the noted reasons for existence.  Determining the speed 
of growth and optimal size to compete in a given market is difficult.  Higgins (1977) realized that 
firms were putting growth and profits above all other measures of a healthy company.  The 
sustainable growth rate (SGR) was developed as a method for analyzing optimal growth using a 
firm’s financial policies or measures.  The sustainable growth rate is the annual change in year 
over year sales that a company can achieve without disrupting the given capital structure.  If 
growth in sales occurs at a different rate, then the financial ratios and over-arching capital 
structure will also have to be adjusted.  (Higgins, 1977) 
Identifying growth is important, possibly more important is comparing actual and 
sustainable growth rates to determine the needed course of action.  To do so, Higgins (2011) 
developed the sustainable growth challenge (SGC).  It can be found by differencing the SGR 
from the actual growth a cooperative realizes.  Management knowing their SGC is described as 
the kingpin of using the SGR model to make financial decisions. (Higgins, 2011) 
Once the firm’s SGR is known, steps should be taken to reach the sustainable rate.  A 
firm that is temporarily growing faster than the SGR would have a positive challenge and would 
likely increase leverage to fund this growth.  Similarly, firms temporarily growing slower than 
the given SGR would be experiencing a negative challenge while accumulating more capital than 
needed and be able to decrease leverage or increase dividend payout ratio.  Higgins (1977) offers 
a number of adjustments that firms can make when their actual growth exceeds sustainable over 
the long term.  Selling new equity is foremost on the list which carries high transaction and 
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indirect costs for firms that can do so and is not feasible for traditional cooperatives.  Other 
possibilities include reducing dividend payout (patronage payout), increasing leverage, 
increasing profit margin, or revise market growth strategies.  Balancing a competitive 
marketplace’s downward pressure on profit margins with owners’ desire for additional dividends 
paid makes any adjustment difficult.  (Higgins, 1977)  
Key methods used by cooperatives to grow are through acquisition of existing facilities 
and territories or building new facilities.  Olson and Pagano (2005) examined long run SGR of 
banking institutions post-acquisition.  Their findings suggest the biggest driver of a firm’s SGR 
post-acquisition are the changes that occur to the SGR and payout ratio once an acquisition has 
taken place as well as the acquiring firm’s SGR prior to the purchase.  Regardless of a firm’s 
SGR, the actual rate of growth that a firm can achieve is directly dependent on the rate of growth 
in the business sectors a firm operates in as well as the competitors’ reactions to acquisition.  
Likewise, it can be expected that cooperatives’ growth is highly dependent on the industries in 
which business is conducted as well as the extent of competition in the marketplace.  (Olson & 
Pagano, 2005) 
Healy et. al (1990) performed similar analyses but instead using the 50 largest mergers 
between 1979 and 1984.  The operating performance for the combined or acquiring firm was 
analyzed relative to industry benchmarks. Their findings indicate a decrease in total revenue for 
the combined firm when compared to the individual firms pre-merger.  Furthermore, their 
findings indicate that firms who did not participate in a merger experienced considerably more 
revenue declines.   The findings highlight that operating efficiency increased across the merged 
firms’ dataset. Thus, supporting efforts and reasoning behind cooperative efforts to improve 
efficiencies through growth and acquisition.  (Healy, Palepu, & Rubak, 1990) 
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Using row crop and livestock farm data from Illinois, Escalante et. al (2009) study the 
SGR of these farms as well as which of the four factors of SGR is most commonly used to 
overcome a challenge.  Using a seemingly unrelated regression, the study finds that leverage and 
earnings retention were the two most common levers used to push SGC and SGR to 
convergence.  Referencing the fact that farmers must submit their business plans to their lenders 
prior to engaging in farming activities for the year, Escalante finds that financial decisions are 
made prior to production and any corrections or convergences must therefore take place post-
production and could be a multi-year balancing endeavor.   
This study also explicitly details the drastic effects of multiple growth levers changing at 
a time.  Heading into the 1980’s farm crisis, farmers across the United States were allowed to 
borrow based on the premise that land values were increasing greatly thus decoupling the 
production capacity of land from its loan value. Correction of this occurred as commodity prices 
declined, interest rates rose, and land values plummeted.  When multiple growth levers adjust at 
once, the SGR, as a multiple of each change, exacerbates the adjustment.   
Escalante et. al highlights the value of using the SGR model in agriculture.   Using the 
SGR to make financial decisions can be viewed as more than merely a practical approach.  From 
the business side of operating, knowing a firm’s SGR can help understand both current and 
future leverage needs as well as the expectations of working capital demands.  Public policy 
decision making can also be aided if the SGR is considered.  If policy-makers are cognizant of 
the current SGR and SGC of a particular ag sector, policies and programs can be designed to 
help ease correction of a challenge or be designed with the SGR implications in mind at a 
minimum.   
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Replicating the SUR model presented by Escalante et. al using grain and farm supply 
cooperative data will aid in describing the decision-making process as well as the acute value of 
each growth lever for U.S. grain and farm supply cooperatives. Additionally, much like their 
study of Illinois farms, the cooperative study will separate data based on cooperative size, 
location, and type of sales.  Using subsets of the data to help explain results on a small scale will 
make the information more applicable and able to be quickly circulated in extension 
publications.   (Escalante et al., 2009) 
 Cooperative Structure 
In the United States, public elections are held on the basis of one vote per person.  In 
corporate America, one vote per share is the way votes are counted when making business 
decisions.  Thus, it is easy to envision shareholders with the most money invested running the 
company’s vote and lesser shareholders going unheard. 
Cook (1995) defines five stages for which to classify cooperatives’ genesis, growth and 
demise.  The first stage outlines the reasons for formation among the diverse types of 
cooperatives.  Two main drivers existed in the formation of cooperatives.  Individual producers 
needed a mechanism to balance over-supply induced price swings as well as counter act 
opportunistic or hold up type scenarios that were particularly common prior to the 1900s.  With 
both major reasons being outside a producer’s control, forming a cooperative is seen as a 
defensive move, whereby, had the prompts not occurred, the cooperative may not have formed.   
In the second stage, it is observed that cooperatives formed to counteract over-supply are 
usually short-lived and have overall negligible impacts on their owners’ profitability or 
livelihood.  GEAPS (2002) identifies a potential pattern in supply-side cooperatives experiencing 
extreme hardship in the early 2000s.  This is due to the over-supply being producer fueled, not 
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consumer fueled among reasons with rooting in the loss of focus on the membership.  Had the 
cooperative introduced a new use or increased demand through another method, both cooperative 
and producer may have enjoyed net positive results.  Cooperatives that were formed to correct 
market failures, which generally deliver better pricing than the existing IOF firm endure infancy. 
Thus, these cooperatives continue gaining the business of patrons and non-patrons alike.  Once 
cooperatives correct a market failure, prices among cooperatives and local IOFs are roughly 
equal, thus entering stage three.  (GEAPS, 2002) 
As prices roughly equalize, property rights and rent extraction start to become member 
issues.  Stage four involves the escalation and recognition of property right problems in 
cooperatives by the management or directors.  Finally, stage five de-escalates the property rights 
pressures by either continuing operations, exiting the business or transitioning to a different 
business structure.   
Examining property rights struggles within cooperatives serves to indicate that revolving 
capitalization can limit a cooperative’s growth projections and targets.  And, if property rights 
are muddled to those not familiar with the subject, a grassroots push for quicker capital turnover 
may exacerbate these problems.  Growth of a cooperative may be the highest priority for a board, 
however, amelioration of property right misunderstandings should occur prior to growing the 
issue and the cooperative simultaneously.  
The examination of property rights struggles is key to understanding the 
undercapitalization of cooperatives and “new-style” cooperatives alike.  Firstly, the free rider 
problem occurs when property rights are untradeable, insecure or unassigned.  This occurs when 
current members or non-members use a resource to their benefit that was not directly or 
adequately invested in to realize the true cost of the usage.  Similarly, long-time members, and 
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non-members oftentimes become invested to the point which they have paid for or invested 
much more resources than needed, if they were to purchase their needed resources separately or 
individually.  An example of a free rider problem would be a cooperative that markets grapes.  If 
a producer refuses to join the marketing cooperative, they could receive all the benefits of the 
marketing cooperative without having to abide by the investment or production quota 
requirements.  A more complex form of free rider or internal free rider is when cooperatives 
value new and old members’ business equally through patronage or residual benefit distributions.  
Due to the reduction in rate of return as investment of a member increases, it incentivizes under 
investment or low levels of investment to fund their cooperative.   
Further property rights problems exist.  The situation of a member’s residual claims to an 
asset last longer than the asset itself is deemed the horizon problem.  The problem is caused by 
lack of a secondary market to transfer claimant rights which would lend liquidity to the members 
and cooperative alike.  The horizon problem disincentives investment by members into new 
opportunities, given their investment period will last longer than the asset itself.  Moving from 
tangible to intangible assets such as research and development or advertising tremendously 
increases the rate at which this problem occurs.  Directors will be pressured to resolve this 
problem by paying cash out quicker than originally planned through both equity redemption and 
member payments relative to investment.  The accelerated cash payments decrease retained 
earnings, thus causing additional need for member investment in future endeavors and 
continuing the cycle that the horizon problem creates.   
Decreased investments by the cooperative members leads to a lower SGR.  And, 
increased equity retirements or cash patronage payments also reduce capital held by the 
cooperative and reduce the SGR.   
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As size and complexity of a cooperative increases, directors are representing a larger 
number of members.   Divergence of director and member interests can occur when a small 
number of members actively lobby a director to alter the direction of the cooperative.  In private 
firms, the external pressures exerted through stock trading and public information work to aid 
directors’ decision making; whereas in cooperatives that have no market for equity and a low 
level of information available, uninformed decision making by members and directors alike 
occurs.  This divergence of member and director interests is known as a control problem.  
Similarly, influence costs can be problematic when a large, diverse membership exists.  The 
limits imposed by a cooperative’s charter as well as the procedures that govern decision making 
determine the speed and amount that a cooperative begins operating in a space not originally 
formed to do.  Influence costs exist when a membership faction pursues selfish cooperative 
endeavors affecting the wealth distribution among members or constituents of a cooperative or 
director.  (Cook, 1995) 
Once the cooperative’s stage is determined, the SGR model can be applied to determine 
the potential growth that a cooperative can achieve in the coming years.  With growth prospects 
known, the cooperative management and board can more accurately project operation and 
financial requirements of the cooperative.  And, the decisions to continue, change or cease 
operations can then be more easily decided.  
In accordance with the risk-balancing hypothesis, Escalante and Barry (2001) detail that 
producers who abide by the hypothesis avoid incurring additional financial obligations when 
business risks are too high.  Conversely, increasing debt levels could be warranted when business 
risk level is low or increasing debt levels will lower business risk.  Producer equity investment in 
cooperatives is largely out of producer control once the investment has been made or the 
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allocation of patronage has taken place.   The portfolio problem highlights that equity is 
generally locked for a period and could force producers to violate the risk-balancing hypothesis, 
thus creating the portfolio problem.  (Escalante & Barry, 2001) 
Cook (1995) posits linked patronage and investment decision making in a cooperative 
causes the portfolio problem.  When members are unable to transfer equity privately or through a 
separate market, the risk aptitude of an individual is not accounted for.  With the inability for 
individuals to adjust their cooperative holdings to reflect their optimal investment portfolio, it is 
likely that directors will be pressured to alter cooperative plans to better suit members’ desired 
risk portfolio.   (Cook, 1995) 
As property right problems are determined and exposed, directors must determine the 
direction of business.  Three options exist for cooperatives in stage five; they are exit, continue 
or transition.  Each choice is dependent on the individual cooperative’s ability to best serve 
current and future member needs.  Within the exit strategy exist general options.  Liquidating all 
assets or restructuring as an investor-oriented firm are the form these options generally assume.  
Shrader (1989) details that low performing cooperatives move toward liquidation, merging or 
acquisitions while high performing cooperatives oftentimes restructure as investor-oriented 
firms.   
Correcting the undercapitalization of the cooperative through the continuance plan can be 
accomplished through seeking outside equity capital or a proportionality strategy within the 
cooperative.  The outside equity capital infusion, while maintaining cooperative status, would be 
accomplished through a joint venture or publicly listed subsidiary of the cooperative.  Whereas 
the proportionality strategy structures the cooperative to pursue proportionally shared economic 
responsibility across the membership.  The resulting strategies and policies generally narrow the 
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scope and refocus business units to enable internal capital levels to be maintained.  Finally, 
transitioning cooperative type exists as the final option in stage five.  The new generation 
cooperative attempts to solve or lessen the property rights problems by developing membership 
policies that do not allow for external free riders, develops asset appreciation policies, creates 
base equity capital plans and increases liquidity of shares through an external delivery rights 
clearinghouse.  (Schrader, 1989) 
Since the mid-1990s, the formation of new generation cooperatives, which are formed to 
ameliorate property rights concerns, has been explosive.   The new cooperatives require closed 
membership.  Once the stock offering is over, someone new cannot come in without purchasing 
a member's stock.  The new cooperative, unlike older entities, requires significant up-front 
investment and a pooling arrangement in which members share equitably on a per-unit basis in 
the revenue stream that has been created.  Farmers are required to deliver according to plan 
regardless of the open market. A St. Paul, MN banker emphasizes that formation of new 
generation cooperatives is an offensive move.   "They are not simply trying to keep input prices 
and basic commodities fair.  They are trying to share in more of the food system revenue 
stream..." (“Industry Activities - Colloquium Speakers See Corn Sweetener Imbalance into 
Future,” 1997)   
New generation cooperatives are built on set amounts of capital, oftentimes the stock is 
tradeable, but membership is closed.  Given the fixed capitalization structure, management is 
better able to plan for future expansion.  Future capital payments are strictly based on per unit 
volume and paid yearly in cash.  Without retained equity, a cooperative can use leverage and 
equity more efficiently; no surprise equity redemption scenario is able to occur. 
13 
 Cooperative Constraints to Accessing Capital 
Earnings for a given company are limited by the asset base and operating efficiency.   
Hailu and Goddard (2009) link gross revenues and equity capital using the SGR model. With 
high commodity prices, an increase in revenues may translate to an increase in SGR, given 
sufficient economies of scale exist and allow for increased profit margin.  Similarly, during low 
commodity prices, revenues and profit margins could be pushed lower which in turn would 
pressure the SGR lower.  With adequate economies of scale enjoyed by a firm, operating 
efficiency will increase—surging the SGR—through better management of assets.  If a firm is 
constrained by its capital sourcing and unable to reach adequate economies of scale, reduced 
levels of operating efficiency and a reduced SGR will be realized by the firm.   
Cooperatives that tie equity redemption to age of a producer or an otherwise extended 
period are prone to having the core owners not be the biggest benefactors.  Issues arise when a 
member or members with vast holdings are due for their equity to be redeemed at the same time 
as other cash needs within a cooperative. Given patrons begin business with the cooperative at 
differing ages, equity redemption tied to age can be sporadic and unpredictable.  Lilydale 
cooperative’s ability to generate cash flow to sufficiently meet equity redemption as well as debt 
taken on for expansion purposes is not unlike many other cooperatives.  Recurrent reliance on 
leverage for growth and expansion lead equity redemption payments more difficult with respect 
to cashflow. The growth that Lilydale achieved was consistently above their SGR by 0.3% for 
the 27 years studied by Hailu and Goddard (2009). 
 The longer a firm operates beyond their SGR, the more difficulty they experience when 
the convergence of actual and sustainable growth occurs.  The study details that equity 
retirement needs directly contributed to Lilydale Cooperative converting to an investor owned 
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firm.  Lilydale was 35% owned by 60+ year old members, the directors needed additional cash in 
the coming years to expand operations and maintain economies of scale in an increasingly 
competitive market which conflicted with the equity redemption plans in place.  Due to the 
conflicting needs of cash and limited sourcing of equity capital, it was found that a corporate 
structure would provide a more permanent equity base while allowing for its members to manage 
their portfolios better and provide a vehicle to further invest in the company for future expansion 
purposes.  A corporate structure was also found to allow for employee and outside investor buy-
in to further growth potential.  (Hailu & Goddard, 2009)  
In Fulton and Girard’s 2015 textbook, the key reasons that cooperatives demutualize 
include poor financial performance, access to capital constraints, personal benefit of a select 
group, a focus on realizing full value of the firm for owners and member engagement declines.  
Cooperatives can improve their performance and longevity expectations by maintaining focus on 
producers as well as maintaining producer to cooperative lines of communication.  Additionally, 
board oversight of management could prove key in steering a cooperative to or away from a 
demutualization.   Many of these factors are member or management driven, however, given its 
external hand in cooperative decision making, access to capital continues to cycle through the 
reasons given for a number of demutualized cooperatives.  (M. Fulton & Girard, 2015) 
 Cooperative’s ability to access sufficient capital is one of the most discussed and 
researched issues in the cooperative literature.  Fulton and Hueth (2009) studied cooperative 
failures, conversions and restructurings and how access to capital played a role in each instance.  
In the study, three groupings were established: 1) conversions or bankruptcy due to poor 
financial performance; 2) conversion to access capital or realize value for the members; and 3) 
cooperatives that were re-engaging in a market or initially forming.   
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As an example of the first group, Rice Growers Association was used to highlight 
management and performance dependencies.  As tight markets gripped the rice cooperative, 
rather than refocus and retrench in the core of the business, the management pitched investments 
in new opportunities as the way forward and promoted diverse business operations.  While poor 
decision making by the management is not isolated to cooperative forms of business, it is more 
likely in cooperatives lacking effective board oversight.  In this instance, a sister cooperative in 
the region that refocused operations into the core business were able to continue operations 
throughout and after a market lull. 
In the second grouping of cooperatives, those that converted to realize full value for 
members and access capital for operations, Fulton and Hueth questioned long-term value to the 
producers.  Measurement of long-term producer welfare was measured through factors like lower 
market competition, how producers were treated, and continuation of operations across the 
region instead of centralized.  In the case of FC Stone conversion, changing structures allowed 
members to benefit through huge financial gains as well as additional access to capital for the 
firm.  Risk management, in this study, was found to be a competitive market, thus whether 
cooperatively owned or investor owned, members, patrons and non-members alike would receive 
equal services before and after the conversion.  In a differing conversion, Diamond Walnut 
Growers, similar reasons were given in favor of conversion by the board, however, member 
outcomes differed.  While redemption of older equity to members was a key reason for 
converting, walnut producers faced a monopsonistic buyer after the conversion.  
 In the third grouping, deficient board oversight, lack of significant buy-in by members, 
and operational performance were cited as reasons for failure. The free rider problem also 
persisted from the very beginnings in the failure cases studied.   (M. E. Fulton & Hueth, 2009) 
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In these cases, using Collins’ (1991) evaluation of three demutualization hypotheses—
corporate acquisition, equity access by membership, and cost of equity—equity access is again 
highlighted.  The study examines cooperatives that used corporate spinoff to publicly list an 
entity of the cooperative.  Collins suggests members that received corporate stock in return for 
the initial holdings of cooperative stock were not always better off.  Members wanting to realize 
their full equity investment value may or may not have realized the full value of their equity, 
which drove the spinoff.  Thus, Collins found that corporate spinoff exacerbated equity liquidity 
issues in both the short and long term for two out of the five cooperatives in this study. (Collins, 
1991) 
 In their study, Fulton and Hueth found that the first group were operating the business 
unsustainably.   This group possesses a management team that found leverage as their method for 
growth.  High leverage eventually lead the cooperative to convert.  Post-conversion, these 
businesses’ management remained, consequently, so did the poor operations and efficiency.   
 For producers, continued control is a legitimate reason to desire cooperative status in the 
firms they do business with.   Fulton and Larson (2009) detail the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool’s 
(SWP) ultimate conversion from cooperative status to investor owned.  Lack of proper oversight 
was listed as a core reason for ultimate conversion due to their share structure.  SWP found itself 
positioned similarly to Lilydale- it needed large amounts of capital to fund vast equity 
redemptions due in the near term.  Ultimately only delaying the conversion, initially SWP opted 
for a dual share structure with traded, non-voting shares and non-trading, voting shares.  The 
voting shares were held by farmers while the traded shares were available for any individual or 
entity to acquire.  Given the board had to answer to both share classes, in conjunction with a lack 
of focus on producer welfare, the board began investing heavily in operations far and wide.  As 
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focus left producers and instead centered on profit potential, SWP’s market share on wheat 
halved.   While cooperative success is needed for the viability of operations, producer success is 
ultimately the reason for cooperative’s existence.  The cooperatives that lost sight of producer 
success and welfare are the instances that were not viable long-term plans for producers to buy 
into.  (M. E. Fulton & Larson, 2009) 
For the cooperatives studied that survived investment drives pushing operations away 
from bulk handling and into further processing, competition is key.  Instead of competing on one 
front or in one business unit, these cooperatives are now competing in multiple stages of 
production and found it more difficult to identify the key profit and loss activities for any given 
period.  Additionally, as operations grow, accurate representation of a business unit and its 
benefit to the cooperative’s members becomes more difficult.   
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Chapter 3 - Sustainable Growth Rate 
 The Sustainable Growth Model 
Many cooperatives are growing at an exceptional rate. Cooperative growth has been 
driven by producer consolidation, a highly competitive marketplace and new opportunities 
through rising global demand. Agricultural producers have benefited from this growth through 
various investments such as grain storage and train loading facilities as well as enhanced access 
to technology. However, if this growth is unsustainable, the cooperative could experience 
significant financial stress, which could potentially harm the producer.   
The sustainable growth rate can be used by a cooperative’s management team and board 
of directors to monitor growth.  The sustainable growth rate (SGR) is a financial metric used by 
many businesses to address potential growth problems. Monitoring growth via the SGR is done 
through examining four key financial ratios – earnings retention, leverage, profit margin, and 
operating efficiency. Each of these ratios positively impacts the SGR, and if examined carefully, 
can show opportunities for improvement and challenges. 
The SGR equation is straightforward and shows how four key financial ratios affect 
cooperative growth.  Cooperative directors and management can view these four ratios as 
“levers” that can be adjusted to drive growth.  The intuition of the sustainable growth model is 
shown below 
Sustainable Growth Rate = Earnings retention x Leverage x Profit margin x          
Operating efficiency          (1) 
The earnings retention lever is the first a board can pull to drive sustainable growth.  If 
additional earnings are retained as patronage or retained earnings, that provides capital to fund 
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growth.  Likewise, payment of the earnings to members in the form of cash patronage reduces 
available capital to fund growth. 
Leverage reflects the capital structure of the cooperative and is controlled by the board of 
directors. Growth can be fueled by adding more debt capital or leverage. Adding debt to fund 
additional investments is a way to boost the SGR.  However, reducing debt capital will pull 
down the SGR due to less capital available to the cooperative to fund growth. 
Profit margin is key to any cooperative’s performance and critical to calculating a SGR. 
It is fairly intuitive that growth is bolstered by higher profits. And, when profits are lower, 
growth is lower. However, a cooperative’s ability to pull this “lever” to drive SGR is limited. For 
example, increasing margins requires either lifting revenues or lowering costs, and in a 
competitive business environment, it is difficult to do either item.  Sales professionals must work 
diligently to maintain the cooperative’s profit margins in the face of competitive price bidding 
and customer price shopping.   
Operating efficiency is the final piece of the SGR equation. This particular “lever” shows 
how efficiently a cooperative’s assets are being utilized to generate sales. So, if a cooperative 
decides to expand assets, then sales needs to rise significantly in order for there to be operating 
efficiencies gains and a higher SGR. Conversely, if assets are reduced or certain assets are 
culled, then sales need to remain at their current levels or drop only slightly to maintain higher 
operating efficiencies and SGRs.  
Further simplifying the SGR model results in two focal points.  Return on equity and 
earnings retention can be multiplied to determine the SGR.  Return on equity is a measure of 
profit earned on equity invested, while the earnings retention quantifies retained earnings in 
relation to net income.  These metrics measure how well a cooperative is at generating then 
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accumulating capital, which drives sustainable growth.  A key takeaway of the SGR model for a 
board of directors is that growth of a firm is not an independent decision, but an interdependent 
decision based on acceptable financial and operating ratios.   
When the SGR is compared to actual growth rates, the sustainable growth challenge 
(SGC) can be identified. Higgins (2011) states that the SGC is the difference between actual 
sales and SGR.  The SGC is a straightforward way to observe how far a firm is straying from the 
SGR and, over time, see where the correction was made to converge to the SGR. If a business 
has a positive SGC, then actual growth rates exceeded SGR, which means outside financing is 
necessary to fund growth. A negative SGC indicates the firm is not meeting their growth target 
and potentially not capturing full value for their owners. (Higgins, 2011)  
 Calculating the Sustainable Growth Rate 
The SGR and SGC equations are straightforward in showing how four key financial 
ratios affect growth. It is important to recognize that the growth levers influence each other. 
Equations (2) and (3) show the growth lever interdependency.  Profit margin, operating 
efficiency and SGC use ‘Total Sales’ in their calculations. ‘Net Income’ appears in earnings 
retention and profit margin. Furthermore, ‘Total Equity’ increases if the board decides to retain 
more earnings within cooperative so earnings retention and leverage are connected.   
𝑆𝐺𝑅 =  (1 −
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
) (1 +
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
) (
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
) (
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
) 
 
 
 
 
  𝑆𝐺𝐶 = ln(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡 − 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡−1) − 𝑆𝐺𝑅  
(2) 
Earnings 
Retention 
Leverage Profit 
Margin 
Operating 
Efficiency 
(3) 
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SGC and actual growth rate convergence is caused by the need for a cooperative to 
weather economic downturns.  Determining the timing of growth lever adjustment is crucial.  
Whether the adjustment occurs prior to a strategy implementation, as a result of the strategy 
outcomes, or a combination of the two is key to understanding the decision making of a 
cooperative.  Likely, given the price, volume, and efficiency uncertainties that cooperatives face, 
the cooperative makes growth, credit needs, and sales projections in advance.  Following harvest, 
with financial metrics known and uncertainties now certain, adjusting the growth levers is 
needed balance growth experienced in the operating year.  For example, if a higher than 
anticipated operating efficiency leads to the SGR exceeding actual growth, then decisions could 
involve reducing debt, increasing patronage or increasing earnings retention.  Decision making 
post-production year must dictate the purpose of the extra income – whether it is to be retained, 
paid to patrons, or reducing debt, it must be accounted for to properly close the year.  Likewise, 
additional leverage may be called for to fund investments or bridge the gap between revenue and 
expenses in a lackluster year.   
When the actual rate of growth exceeds the sustainable rate, a positive SGC exists.  
Positive growth challenges require outside capital to fund growth and maintain operations.  An 
SGR that exceeds actual rates of growth contributes to an excess of capital in the firm.  The firm 
must take steps to allocate the uses or purpose of the buildup.   Actual and SGR convergence 
leads the SGC to go to zero.   
A zero value SGC indicates that no additional financing is required, and no buildup of 
capital occurs.  Furthermore, with an SGC value of zero, the firm exactly captures the value 
which its asset base and operating efficiency dictate.  A zero value SGC promotes the Pecking 
Order Theory’s rule number one which says the best way to avoid lender skepticism and default 
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is by using internal financing.  Under a zero SGC scenario, excess capital would be put to use as 
it came available. 
The management and directors must position a cooperative to weather the cyclical farm 
production and price swings.  In order for a cooperative to weather a downturn, the growth levers 
must not be at their limits.  Through the potential need for leverage increases, say, a 
cooperative’s leverage at any given time must remain at or below tolerable levels.  Once the 
leverage rises above tolerable, an unforeseen downturn calling for additional leverage could lead 
a cooperative to be unable to further leverage.  And potentially need to reduce the asset base in 
order to provide needed liquidity.  Due to the need for operating longevity, convergence of the 
SGR and SGC represents the safest position for a cooperative to locate. 
Earnings retention is the first lever a board can pull to drive SGR. If additional earnings 
are retained within the cooperative, either as retained patronage or as retained earnings, this 
provides additional capital for growth.  Similarly, if earnings are not retained, then they are 
distributed back to patrons in the form of cash patronage, which means the cooperative will have 
less capital to fund growth. 
Leverage reflects the capital structure of the cooperative and is controlled by the board of 
directors.  Using debt to fund additional investments is a way to boost the SGR.  Elevated levels 
of leverage reduce the ability of a cooperative to weather unexpected events, thus making it more 
susceptible to failure or restructuring.  Furthermore, lenders allow a finite extent of a business to 
be leveraged before the risk becomes in excess of tolerable limits.  Reducing debt capital will 
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pull the SGR lower because the cooperative will not have as much capital available to fund 
growth. 
Profit margin is key to any cooperative’s performance and critical to calculating growth.  
It is fairly intuitive that growth is bolstered by higher profits; when profits are lower, growth is 
lower.  However, a cooperative’s ability to pull this “lever” to drive SGR is limited.  For 
example, increasing margins requires either elevating prices or lowering costs, and in a 
competitive business environment, it is difficult to do either item. 
Operating efficiency is the final metric used in the SGR equation. This lever measures 
how efficiently a cooperative’s assets are being utilized to generate sales.  When a cooperative 
decides to expand assets, then sales needs to rise significantly in order for there to be an 
operating efficiency gain and increased SGR. Conversely, if assets are reduced or certain assets 
are culled, then sales need to remain at their current levels or drop only slightly to maintain an 
increased operating efficiency and SGR.  
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Chapter 4 - Data Discussion 
The CoBank Risk Analyst database provided the panel data of 162 cooperatives for 
analysis.  Each cooperative has data for 19 years spanning from 1996 to 2014.  Given the data 
used was generated by a financial institution, precise and accurate financials are available for 
analysis.  Furthermore, the dataset contains years of extreme growth, as well as decline for 
individual and aggregate cooperatives.  These growth variations help to better understand how a 
cooperative drives growth and overcomes a growth challenge.  With a dataset as large and 
complete as this, empirical analyses of the cooperatives provide results that are applicable to a 
wide range of cooperatives.  (“CoBank Risk Analyst Database,” 2017) 
With such an expansive dataset, the empirical analyses may not be directly applicable to 
specific cooperatives.  To better allow for comparison and application at the individual 
cooperative level, the dataset is divided into subsets for analysis.  Half of the dataset is made up 
of cooperatives with sales of less than $50 million annually.  Given this makeup, the dataset is 
split at $50 million.  Cooperatives with less than $50 million in annual sales comprise the low 
sales subset.  And, the cooperatives with greater than $50 million in annual sales comprise the 
high sales subset. 
Another subset split was made on the basis of farm supply sales.  Cooperatives which 
engage primarily in farm supply sales likely do not have as much activity in grain handling.  
Farm supply sales requires large inventories and high competition to maintain sales, however the 
sales are near constant in boom and bust years.  Grain handling requires large infrastructure 
investments that require upkeep in boom and bust years alike.  These differences in capital 
requirements, inventory management strategies, and profit margins necessitated the separation 
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into subsets.   A cooperative which generated the majority (50-100%) of total sales through farm 
supply sales is classified as a majority farm supply cooperative.  The cooperatives with a 
minority (0-50%) of total sales generated through farm supply sales are classified as minority 
farm supply cooperatives.   
Finally, due to the volume differences between cooperatives in the corn belt and those 
that are not, a regional subset detailing whether a cooperative is operating within or outside of 
the corn belt is used. The corn belt cooperatives enjoy a higher level of consistency in production 
and production requirements, thus enabling different financial decision making and requiring a 
subset split.    Location information is available at the state level; states partially in the corn belt 
are not used given there is no way to distinguish specific location.  Cooperatives in Iowa, Illinois 
or Indiana makeup the corn belt subset with corn belt parameters given by The Corn Belt.   And, 
cooperatives not located in Iowa, Illinois, or Indiana makeup the non-corn belt states. (Jones & 
Duran, 1954)  
A cooperative’s classification, for example by total sales dollars or by type of sales, was 
made based on the final year of available data.  For example, if a cooperative had sales of $25 
million in 1996 and sales of $65 million in 2014, it would be classified by the 2014 sales number 
which puts it in the mid-sized category of $50-250 million in sales, along with 37% percent of 
the dataset.  Once categorized, all years of a cooperative’s data are tagged as being a “mid-sized” 
cooperative, even if only the final year generated the revenue needed to be located in the mid-
sized class.    
The states represented in the dataset include: Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, 
Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Mississippi, North 
Dakota, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia 
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and Wisconsin.  Additionally, 82 of the cooperatives, or 50.6% are recognized in the less than 
$50 million in sales subset; 60 cooperatives or 37% are in the $50-$250 million category; and the 
remaining 20 cooperatives having sales greater than $250 million comprise 12.4% of the total 
number of cooperatives.  The 52 cooperatives that make up the corn belt subset represent 
approximately a third of the dataset while cooperatives not in the corn belt make up the 
remaining 109 cooperatives and roughly two thirds of the data.   Cooperatives that receive a 
majority of sales through farm supply sales makeup 31.5% of the dataset while those with a 
minority of sales generated by farm supply sales comprise 111 cooperatives or 68.5% of the 
dataset. 
 Descriptive Statistics 
Ease of interpretation and usage are the key reasons for using the sustainable growth rate 
(SGR) model to compare year to year growth.  Calculating the SGR is accomplished by 
multiplying the four growth levers.  Figure 4-1 graphically shows year to year changes in the 
SGR and SGC.  An SGR value above zero indicates that year-over-year revenue growth was 
positive, likewise, a negative SGR value indicates that year-over-year revenue growth was 
negative.  A positive SGC value means that a cooperative has outstripped their resources and 
outside finances are needed to fund growth.  Negative SGC values indicate that a firm is growing 
slower than sustainable which causes accumulation of capital, lowering of leverage or increased 
patronage payment as well as potentially not capturing the full value for the owners.   
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Figure 4-1 Sustainable Growth Rate and Sustainable Growth Challenge (percent) of 
Farmer Cooperatives from 1996 to 2014 
  
Source: CoBank Risk Analyst Data 
 
A paradox of the SGR model is that, by its name, one would assume that the sustainable 
growth rate of one year can be continued into perpetuity, however, that is not necessarily true.   
The financial performance would have to continue as well.  Due to the nature of the calculation, 
a firm’s SGR is based on the current performance only.  Thus, in figure 4-1, the SGR fluctuates 
from year to year but represents the highest rate of growth that the aggregate cooperatives could 
achieve in each year, given their financial metrics.   
In the early 2000s, the multi-year decreasing sustainable growth rate demonstrates how 
the Farmland Industries collapse affected cooperatives across the nation.  Likewise, SGC leapt 
upward as leverage was heavily used to continue operations in a time of negative profit margins.  
Contrary to the early 2000s, 2008 saw simultaneous increasing levels of SGC and SGR.  This 
points to profitable years leading to large investments which were accomplished using leverage.  
The negative SGC in years centering on 2010 indicate that capital was used to decrease leverage, 
increase patronage, or be retained, which lowered the actual growth to balance with the SGR. 
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Examining the year to year changes to all cooperatives’ financial metrics provides 
intuitive results.  Looking to Figure 4-2, the farmer cooperatives financial metrics by year are 
graphed with leverage, operating efficiency and earnings retention on the left axis while profit 
margin corresponds with the right axis.   
Figure 4-2 Growth Levers of the Sustainable Growth Rate for Farmer Cooperatives from 
1996 to 2014  
 
Source: CoBank Risk Analyst Data 
 
Each growth lever equally represents a portion of the SGR equation.  Given this 
information, growth lever variation would directly contribute to SGR variation.  Looking at 
Figure 4-2, visualizing the variation of growth levers is possible.  Leverage and operating 
efficiency vary greatly across the study period as well as in year to year comparison.  Periods of 
decreasing leverage correspond with periods of decreasing SGC.  Likewise, periods of increasing 
leverage correspond with increasing SGC periods.  The operating efficiency mirrors the SGR’s 
movements across the study period, highlighting the importance of efficiency for cooperatives.  
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These growth levers’ movements being highly correlated with those of the SGR and SGC are 
due to the fact that profit margin and earnings retention are usually quite stable.   
The profit margin’s drastic effect on SGR, as seen in 2003, occurs as the profit margin 
dropped nearly 10 times lower than previous levels.  For any lever, a 1000 percent move will 
greatly affect the SGR and greatly effect the business.  Operating efficiency and earnings 
retention spiked as profit margin moved sharply lower, helping offset the decline.  Moving 
towards the end of the study period, the commodity boom allowed for increased profit margins 
by 40 percent.   Variations in the profit margin lead to large swings in the SGR due to the 
extreme importance of profitability for business longevity.   
Cooperative’s primary way to fund rapid sales growth is through debt capital or leverage. 
Given cooperatives have limited to no ability to raise outside equity capital, leveraging the 
balance sheet through additional debt capital is how cooperatives fund the additional growth. 
Leveraging the balance sheet during very rapid sales growth periods like 2008, has ramifications 
for the SGR. Figure 2 shows that the SGR rose from leverage going up. 
The rapid growth experienced in 2008 and 2012 led to significant investments in 
infrastructure and a change in operational efficiency. A rise in operational efficiency occurred 
following the rapid rise in 2008 sales but it has tapered off recently. Incidentally, as operational 
efficiency has fallen, the SGR has fallen too. Cooperative directors and managers should be 
keenly focused on deploying capital in a way that will bolster operational efficiency for future 
growth. 
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SGR and growth lever analyses are enhanced when looking at each subset.  Examining 
the data by subset allows for determination of the drivers of higher or lower growth cooperatives.   
Table 4-1 shows variation across subsets.   
Table 4-1 Mean Cooperative Financial Metrics, by Farmer Cooperative Subset 
Number of 
Cooperatives
Operating 
Efficiency 
Ratio
Profit 
Margin (%)
Earnings 
Retention 
rate (%)
Leverage 
ratio
Total Sales 
(Million $)
Sustainable 
Growth 
Rate (%)
Sustainable 
Growth 
Challenge (%)
All 162 2.81 2.24% 75.05% 2.17 63.40 7.70% -2.01%
Farm Supply Sales 
Generate 0-25% of 
Total Sales
46 2.53 2.13% 74.48% 2.28 92.90 8.05% -0.82%
Farm Supply Sales 
Generate 25-50% 
of Total Sales
15 2.20 2.37% 78.44% 1.92 32.80 6.83% -1.25%
Farm Supply Sales 
Generate 50-75% 
of Total Sales
36 2.26 3.40% 71.43% 1.80 22.20 7.25% -3.32%
Farm Supply Sales 
Generate 75-100% 
of Total Sales
65 2.35 3.60% 74.55% 1.81 18.40 7.44% -2.48%
Less than $50 
million in Total 
Sales
82 2.45 2.47% 72.33% 1.82 15.40 6.35% 2.50%
Greater than $50 
million in Total 
Sales
80 2.90 2.21% 75.40% 2.53 112.63 9.08% -1.53%
Located in the 
Corn Belt
53 3.10 1.86% 78.15% 2.28 85.00 8.52% -2.14%
Not Located in the 
Corn Belt
109 2.66 2.42% 73.54% 2.11 52.80 7.29% -1.04%
Std. Dev. 41 0.29 0.55% 2.21% 0.24 33.68 0.79% 1.54%
Mean 72 2.58 2.52% 74.82% 2.08 55.06 7.61% -1.34%
 
Source: CoBank Risk Analyst Data 
Commented [A1]: Not really financial metrics. It is the 
breakdown of the SGR ratios 
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The category of cooperatives with annual sales greater than $50 million showed the 
highest levels of annual revenue growth as well as the highest levels of leverage.  Lowest levels 
of annual growth were recognized by cooperatives with 75-100% of sales coming from farm 
supplies.   
The subset with 0-25 percent of total sales from farm supply sales show marked financial 
metric differences when compared to the highest farm supply quartile, 75-100 percent.  Profit 
margin for the low farm supply sales cooperatives is half that of the highest quartile for farm 
supply sales.  And, earnings retention is 7 percent higher for the 0-25 percent farm supply sales 
cooperatives.  Leverage for the lowest supply sales cooperatives has a mean value 30 percent 
above that of the highest supply sales cooperatives.    
Corn belt cooperatives’ high efficiency is likely due to the high volumes that those 
cooperatives manage.   Proximity to end user and transportation availability allows these 
cooperatives to not only store vast quantities but cycle more yet through the cooperative 
throughout the year.   Additionally, the corn belt cooperatives operate in a lower profit margin 
environment, but manage to retain more earnings, when compared to non-corn belt cooperatives.  
In total, all financial metrics of the corn belt cooperatives are higher than those of non-corn belt 
cooperatives, barring profit margin.   
Cooperative statistics by size exhibit intuitive and applicable information.  The lowest 
total sales category, with sales less than $50 million, makes up just over half the dataset and 
holds the lowest growth rate among size categories.  The largest cooperatives with sales greater 
than $50 million annually, showed the highest revenue growth that was greater than twice that of 
the low sales category.  These large cooperatives also operate the most efficiently and retain the 
most earnings when comparing to low sales cooperatives. 
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The low sales cooperatives realize the lowest SGR among all firms chiefly due to the 
lowest earnings retention rate of all subsets. Furthermore, the profit margin and operating 
efficiency are among the lowest for all subsets.  This compares to cooperatives with greater than 
$50 million in sales which operate the most efficiently, retain among the most earnings, and also 
use the highest levels of leverage among all cooperative subsets. 
The greatest SGR mean value of the subsets was realized by cooperatives with sales 
greater than $50 million.  Interestingly, comparing these to the SGR of low sales cooperatives, 
less than $50 million in total sales, shows that cooperatives with sales over $50 million enjoy a 
43 percent higher SGR.  These cooperatives also have an SGR that is 17 percent higher than that 
of all cooperatives.   
The lowest quartile of farm supply cooperatives, those with 0-25 percent of total sales 
generated through farm supply sales, experienced the greatest SGR, when comparing to all other 
quartiles of farm supply sales cooperatives.  This style of cooperative is likely focused on grain 
and grain operations as opposed to farm supplies.   
Tables 4-2 and 4-3 compare SGR and SGC within each subset to demonstrate 
variabilities.  Comparing the smallest and largest cooperatives in the dataset show marked 
differences.  Cooperatives with sales greater than $50 million generated a three percent higher 
mean SGR than cooperatives with sales less than $50 million.  Furthermore, the SGC of the 
larger cooperatives had a higher median value, by a similar three percent, than smaller 
cooperatives.   Cooperatives with sales greater than $50 million generated their highest mean 
sustainable growth in 2008, as the farm economy strengthened, and grain prices soared. 
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Table 4-2 Mean Sustainable Growth Rates (percent) of Farmer Cooperatives from 1996 to 
2014, by Farmer Cooperative Subset 
Year All
Low 
Sales
High 
Sales
Minority 
Farm 
Supply 
Sales
Majority 
Farm 
Supply 
Sales
Corn 
Belt
Non-
Corn 
Belt
1996 6.95% 5.79% 8.11% 7.15% 6.52% 6.91% 6.96%
1997 7.55% 6.09% 9.05% 7.47% 7.74% 8.20% 7.24%
1998 8.01% 6.94% 9.12% 7.99% 8.07% 7.68% 8.18%
1999 7.25% 6.57% 7.95% 7.47% 6.74% 6.83% 7.45%
2000 5.27% 4.99% 5.56% 5.42% 4.95% 4.79% 5.50%
2001 5.31% 4.56% 6.07% 5.31% 5.30% 4.84% 5.53%
2002 3.62% 2.21% 5.07% 5.12% 0.37% 5.86% 2.54%
2003 -3.66% -6.59% -0.66% -2.68% -5.80% 3.64% -7.22%
2004 4.73% 4.40% 5.08% 4.27% 5.75% 4.91% 4.65%
2005 6.77% 6.00% 7.55% 6.59% 7.14% 6.99% 6.65%
2006 7.93% 5.53% 10.39% 7.55% 8.75% 9.61% 7.11%
2007 7.93% 6.05% 9.85% 8.40% 6.91% 9.64% 7.10%
2008 13.60% 12.47% 14.75% 13.35% 14.17% 13.16% 13.82%
2009 14.13% 12.55% 15.74% 15.76% 10.58% 17.15% 12.66%
2010 11.70% 10.28% 13.15% 12.90% 9.07% 13.99% 10.58%
2011 10.68% 8.56% 12.85% 11.41% 9.08% 10.79% 10.63%
2012 10.86% 9.00% 12.76% 11.24% 10.02% 10.80% 10.88%
2013 9.52% 8.15% 10.93% 8.81% 11.07% 8.26% 10.14%
2014 8.11% 7.12% 9.12% 7.67% 9.06% 7.88% 8.22%
Mean 7.70% 6.35% 9.08% 7.96% 7.13% 8.52% 7.30%
Median 7.93% 6.09% 9.12% 7.55% 7.74% 7.88% 7.24%
Std. dev. 0.039 0.040 0.038 0.039 0.041 0.034 0.044   
Source: CoBank Risk Analyst Data 
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Table 4-3 Mean Sustainable Growth Challenge (percent) of Farmer Cooperatives from 
1997 to 2014, by Farmer Cooperative Subset 
Year All Low Sales High Sales
Minority 
Farm 
Supply Sales
Majority 
Farm 
Supply 
Sales
Corn Belt
Non-Corn 
Belt
1997 -2.99% 16.71% -33.80% -3.39% -14.34% -5.77% -31.80%
1998 -10.15% 10.82% -27.58% -11.71% -34.52% -15.46% -26.66%
1999 -18.00% -13.85% -8.07% -17.84% -58.79% -21.90% -8.71%
2000 -2.42% 11.22% 2.79% -2.66% -4.43% -0.70% 2.76%
2001 0.11% 18.94% 9.08% -2.69% 12.86% 5.13% 9.05%
2002 -2.63% -21.99% -2.92% -2.23% -27.80% -4.33% -2.91%
2003 18.28% 6.53% 30.32% 19.72% 11.07% 18.60% 30.34%
2004 6.06% 2.49% 17.25% 7.68% 7.18% 1.71% 17.22%
2005 -5.05% 18.70% -0.77% -8.72% 9.36% -4.59% -0.71%
2006 0.21% 13.32% 33.89% -1.79% 4.94% -5.61% 33.84%
2007 8.87% 2.96% 7.34% 11.84% 5.99% 17.53% 7.33%
2008 22.50% 45.96% 15.55% 28.74% 11.07% 24.87% 28.71%
2009 -14.44% -38.11% -55.36% -12.75% 10.01% -6.67% -56.48%
2010 -23.84% -19.19% -16.47% -23.46% -29.16% -29.93% -16.48%
2011 11.82% 3.91% 24.74% 12.84% 5.55% 15.05% 24.71%
2012 0.90% 0.37% -11.89% -0.03% 3.80% 2.83% -11.82%
2013 -7.89% -15.74% -42.92% -4.73% -27.23% -9.68% -42.94%
2014 -17.45% 1.97% 25.86% -19.14% -23.06% -19.55% 25.90%
Mean -2.01% 2.50% -1.83% -1.69% -7.64% -2.14% -1.04%
Median -2.53% 3.43% 1.01% -2.67% 4.37% -4.46% 1.02%
Std. dev. 0.121 0.186 0.250 0.133 0.204 0.143 0.257
note:  SGC=ln⁡(Total Sales(t)- Total Sales(t-1) ) - SGR)   
Source: CoBank Risk Analyst Data 
Comparing cooperatives based on region highlights that corn belt cooperatives were 
largely insulated from the Farmland Industries crash in the early 2000s.  Corn belt cooperatives 
also achieved a higher level of SGR, by 16.7 percent, than non-corn belt cooperatives for the 
entire study period.  Cooperatives located outside the corn belt experienced SGC mean values 
that were slightly negative across the period which possibly indicates they were not capturing 
full value for owners, however, the corn belt cooperatives maintained a lower SGC.  The corn 
belt cooperatives’ SGC was 105 percent lower than that of non-corn belt cooperatives.  While the 
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SGC for both corn belt and non-corn belt cooperatives is negative, the corn belt cooperatives 
realized a lower SGC.  This indicates that both are potentially not growing as fast as sustainable, 
however, the corn belt cooperatives are doing so to a greater extent.  
Comparing growth in cooperatives based on farm supply sales exhibits that a key to 
growth is consistency.  Cooperatives with a minority of their sales coming from farm supplies 
are generally engaging in more grain sales, on a percentage basis, than other cooperatives.  Given 
this difference, large swings in the price and quantity of grain affected cooperatives with a 
minority of sales from farm supplies to a greater degree with both higher and lower SGC 
oscillations in the late 2000s than other cooperatives in the dataset.  Majority farm supply sales 
cooperatives are dependent on consistent farm supply sales.   
Comparing low and high sales cooperatives provides interesting information.  Low sales 
cooperatives tie for the lowest SGR among all subsets.  Furthermore, these cooperatives have a 
positive mean SGC, suggesting an outstripping of capital and potential to growth broke.  
Meanwhile, the high sales cooperatives realized a 43 percent higher SGR as well as a 236 
percent lower SGC.  The larger cooperatives may not be using their resources as effectively as 
possible – they could be growing faster, given their negative SGC.  
A cooperative’s performance and growth are highly dependent on the marketplace in 
which it operates.  An expanding and growing market would allow for expansion and growth in 
the cooperative more readily.  Consistently engaging resources and capital in farm supply sales 
proves to generate more variable SGC values than minority farm supply cooperatives.  Likely, 
the higher dependency on one business unit, farm supply sales, causes majority farm supply sales 
cooperatives to be susceptible to changes in the marketplace to a greater degree than actual 
changes to their business decisions.  Moreover, the cooperatives with majority of sales from farm 
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supplies generated nearly equal mean SGR values as minority farm supply sales cooperatives, 
with a full seven percent higher SGC median value across the study period. 
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Chapter 5 - Empirical Results 
A growth challenge can occur due to strategic investment and planning or an unforeseen 
circumstance.  Overcoming a growth challenge requires deliberate action on the cooperative’s 
part.  With longevity of a cooperative in mind, knowing the most efficient methods for changing 
the SGR or SGC is valuable.  A cooperative which can more efficiently change or react to 
growth needs will likely persist longer.  Efficiently using retained earnings, leverage, profit 
margin or operating efficiency to overcome a challenge can set the foundation for continued 
growth and expansion.  To the contrary, poor use of the growth levers could stretch resources too 
thin without achieving balanced, sustainable growth. 
The contributors of a growth challenge can be calculated to better understand how 
investment and operating activities may lead to a growth challenge.  The year over year change 
in the growth levers is regressed on the SGC using a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) to 
properly account for interrelated growth levers causing correlated error terms.  The resulting 
coefficients represent unit changes in the SGC for each year over year change in growth lever.  
Determining the highest growth cooperative type allows for cooperatives to strive for 
growth through business unit alignment.  An OLS regression model is used to study the effects.  
The purpose of the OLS model is to explain the determinants SGR using the dummy variables of 
the cooperative type.   
The OLS model uses Equations 4-6.  Where Small is the dummy variable equaling one if 
the cooperative has sales less than $50 million, otherwise zero.  Corn is the dummy variable 
equaling one if the cooperative is located within a corn belt state.  Supply is the dummy variable 
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equaling one if the cooperative receives greater than 50 percent of total sales from farm supply 
sales.  
SGR = β1 + β2Small+ ε1 
SGR = β1 + β2Corn + ε1 
SGR = β1 + β2Supply + ε1  
Looking at table 5-1, the effect that a cooperative type has on SGR is shown.  Low sales 
cooperatives, those with sales less than $50 million, have nearly a three percent lower SGR than 
cooperatives with sales greater than that threshold.  The corn belt cooperatives enjoy a boosted 
SGR by 1.2 percent, compared to non-corn belt cooperatives.  Finally, the majority farm supply 
cooperatives realize a slightly lower SGR, a decrease of 0.83 percent, compared to minority farm 
supply cooperatives. 
Table 5-1 Regression Analysis of Sustainable Growth Rate Dependent variable and 
Independent Dummy Variables 
Variable
Cooperative with 
Sales less than $50 
million = 1, zero 
otherwise
Cooperative 
located in the 
Cornbelt = 1, zero 
otherwise
Marjority Farm 
Supply Cooperative 
= 1, zero otherwise
Intercept 0.0908 0.0729 0.0796
Dummy 
Variable 
Coefficient
-0.0273 0.0123 -0.0083
R^2 0.0254 0.0045 0.0020
note: each coefficient significant at the 5 percent level   
Source: CoBank Risk Analyst Data 
 
 Growth levers and the Sustainable Growth Challenge 
Higgins (1977) SGR model does little in explaining causality or signaling.  Given a firm 
uses their SGR to make business decisions and a firm’s business decisions are factors of the 
SGR, it is easy to miss which causes the other.  The interrelated growth levers cause endogenous 
(6) 
 
(5) 
 
(4) 
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regressors.  Utilizing a SUR model helps explain the variables’ contribution to the respective 
growth lever with the influences measured jointly.  (Higgins, 1977) 
Using an OLS regression requires zero correlation among error terms.  Once the Breusch-
Pagan test suggested correlation among error terms, use of a standard regression model proved 
futile.  A SUR model was developed to properly allow for correlated error terms.  The purpose of 
the SUR model is to explain the determinants of each growth lever and the SGC.  In this study, 
the sureg procedure, available in Stata, is employed which uses the asymptotically efficient, 
feasible generalized least-squares algorithm developed in Greene (2003).    (Greene, 2003) 
The SUR model uses Equations 7-11.  With one equation for each of the four growth 
levers as dependent and lagged dependent variables and using SGC as an independent variable 
then using a fifth equation with SGC as the dependent variable and the year over year change in 
each growth lever used as independent variables.  Each of the four growth levers as dependent 
variables of a regression measures the determinants of those growth levers.  The SGC regression 
measures which levers are used when a challenge exists.  The SUR model used and that it allows 
for correlated error terms for a given variable across equations. 
OEt = β01 + β11OEt-1 + β21SGCt + β31dummy_variable + ε1 
PMt = β02 + β12PMt-1 + β22SGCt + β32dummy_variable + ε2 
LEVt = β03 + β13LEVt-1 + β23SGCt + β33dummy_variable + ε3 
ERt = β04 + β14ERt-1 + β24SGCt + β34dummy_variable + ε4 
SGCt = β05 + β15ChgOEt-1tot β25ChgPMt-1tot + β35ChgLEVt-1tot + β45ChgERt-1tot + 
β55dummy_variable+ ε5 
Where OE is the Operating efficiency ratio, PM is the Profit margin, ER is the Earnings 
retention rate, Lev is Leverage and the dummy_variable is equal to 1 to examine the particular 
(7) 
 
(9) 
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data subset of interest, otherwise equal to 0.  The prefix Chg denotes the year over year change 
for a given variable.  
Table 5-2 shows the summary statistics of each variable used in the SUR model as well 
as the calculation methods of each variable to better familiarize the reader with the metrics and 
their usage.  The earnings retention and profit margin are bound between zero and one, given 
their calculation method.  Interestingly, the mean year over year change in leverage, operating 
efficiency and profit margin are positive while the mean year over year change in earnings 
retention is negative.  This is interesting due to the contrast when comparing all ‘change levers’.  
While each ‘change lever’ represented in table 5-2 is an average, the negative value for earnings 
retention rate represents a decrease in this lever during the study period. 
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Table 5-2 Seemingly Unrelated Regression Summary Statistics for Farmer Cooperatives 
from 1996-2014\ 
Variable Definition Obs Mean Std. Dev.
SGR (PM*OE*LEV*ER) 3,075 0.0770 0.0857
Dependent Variables
Operating Efficiency (Net_Sales/Total_Assets) 3,076 2.8056 1.5507
Leverage 1+(Total_Liabilities/Equity) 3,076 2.1682 0.9867
Earnings Retention 1-(PatDiv_Cash/Net_Income) 3,075 0.7505 0.6645
Profit Margin Net_Income/Net_Sales) 3,076 0.0224 0.0242
SGC ln(Net Salest - Net Salest-1) - SGR -0.0201 0.2255
Independent Variables
lagged Operating 
Efficiency
Levt-1 2,914 2.8103 1.5538
lagged Profit Margin OEt-1 2,914 0.0220 0.0238
lagged Leverage PMt-1 2,914 2.1825 1.0029
lagged Earnings 
Retention
ERt-1 2,913 0.7489 0.6794
Change in Leverage Levt - Levt-1 2,913 0.0257 0.2468
Change in Operating 
Efficiency
OEt - OEt-1 2,913 0.0318 0.3321
Change in Profit 
Margin
PMt - PMt-1 2,912 1.5598 76.4130
Change in Earnings 
Retention
ERt - ERt-1 2,912 -0.0745 3.4073
 
Source: CoBank Risk Analyst Data 
 
Comparing cooperatives based on total sales shows interesting differences in how these 
cooperatives overcome a growth challenge.  These comparisons can be made by looking to table 
5-3.  Cooperatives with annual sales of less than $50 million are hereafter referred to as low sales 
cooperatives.  There are 82 cooperatives that make up the low sales cooperative subset.  
Cooperatives which generate annual sales exceeding $50 million are hereafter referred to as high 
sales cooperatives; 80 such cooperatives exist in this subset.   High and low sales cooperatives 
are individually compared to all cooperatives to determine how strategies differ.  In table 5-3, a 
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dummy variable, large, is used and takes a value of one if annual sales are greater than $50 
million, otherwise zero.  
Table 5-3 Seemingly Unrelated Regression Model Results based on Gross Revenue for 
years 1996-2014 
All cooperatives in the 
data set (% of total)
Cooperatives with 
sales less than $50 
million (50.6%)
Cooperatives with 
sales greater than $50 
million (49.4%)
obs. 2911 1473 1078
Dependent Variable: Operating Efficiency
lagged OE 0.9063**(0.0071) 0.9307**(0.0087) 0.9005**(0.0115)
SGC 1.7531**(0.0640) 1.9540**(0.0782) 1.7145**(0.1293)
large 0.0084(0.0286)
intercept 0.2693**(0.0278) 0.2079**(0.0292) 0.2966**(0.0435)
r^2 0.7476 0.767 0.7628
Dependent Variable: Leverage
lagged Leverage 0.7793**(0.0102) 0.8427**(0.0123) 0.7739**(0.0170)
SGC 0.9071**(0.0558) 0.6127**(0.0563) 1.1603**(0.1101)
large 0.1287**(0.0263)
intercept 0.4288**(0.0257) 0.3061**(0.0257) 0.5743**(0.0489)
r^2 0.5142 0.5129 0.4543
Dependent Variable: Earnings Retention
lagged ER 0.0091(0.0184) 0.0017(0.0257) 0.0137(0.0304)
SGC -0.0755(0.0556) -0.0800(0.0884) -0.1534(0.0926)
large -0.0143(0.0251)
intercept 0.7515**(0.0225) 0.7570**(0.0277) 0.7267**(0.0302)
r^2 0.0009 0.0003 0.0018
Dependent Variable: Profit Margin
lagged PM 0.6053**(0.0143) 0.6215**(0.0198) 0.5508**(0.0244)
SGC -0.0222**(0.0015) -0.0289**(0.0025) -0.0163**(0.0022)
large -0.0018**(0.0007)
intercept 0.0096**(0.0006) 0.0090**(0.0007) 0.0091**(0.0007)
r^2 0.4346 0.4635 0.3607
Dependent Variable: SGC
Chg_Lev 0.7095**(0.0123) 0.7519**(0.0159) 0.6590**(0.0203)
Chg_OE 0.5975**(0.0092) 0.7349**(0.0125) 0.5158**(0.0147)
Chg_PM 0.0001(0.0043) -0.0002(0.0003) 0.0001**(0.0033)
Chg_ER -0.0003(0.0007) -0.0001(0.0007) -0.0050(0.0041)
large -0.0055(0.0051)
intercept -0.0547**(0.0036) -0.0585**(0.0031) -0.0588**(0.0045)
r^2 0.6248 0.7219 0.5664
note: standard error in parentheses
note: ** denotes significance at the 5% level
note: large equals 1 if annual sales are greater than $50 million, otherwise zero  
Source: CoBank Risk Analyst Data 
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Running a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) model on each growth lever and the 
sustainable growth challenge (SGC) was necessitated by correlated endogenous regressors.  The 
growth lever determinants were analyzed to ensure the SUR properly accounted for all 
endogeneity related to a sustainable growth rate (SGR) or SGC calculation. However, the 
determinants of growth levers do not add new information to cooperative management or board 
members on how to best overcome a growth challenge.   Thus, the focus of this analysis is on the 
SGC regression which indicates how a cooperative best overcomes a challenge.   
In all cooperatives, the year over year change in leverage and operating efficiency are the 
only two regressors that are significant.  The leverage coefficient indicates that a 0.71 change in 
SGC occurs following a change to leverage.  Change in operating efficiency has a smaller 
coefficient at 0.5975, however, the interpretation is the same.  Profit margin is an insignificant 
value, however, the coefficient of 0.0001 represents a tenth of a percent of the magnitude of the 
significant variables.   This indicates that adjusting profit margin is not a method of cooperatives 
to overcome a growth challenge.  The change in earnings retention variable is insignificant, 
however, its negative coefficient offers interesting implications to overcoming a growth 
challenge. 
The dummy variable’s coefficient of 0.84% indicates that high sales cooperatives may 
have an elevated growth challenge, as compared to the low sales cooperatives.  The coefficient is 
insignificant but offers intimations, nonetheless.  One such intimation would imply that reaching 
the high sales cooperative status will boost the SGR in and of itself. 
Looking at low sales cooperatives, the significant variables in the SGC regression are 
larger than for all cooperatives.  The change in leverage is 6 percent larger for low sales 
cooperatives.  And, the change in operating efficiency is 23 percent larger for the low sales 
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cooperatives as well.  Although insignificant interesting coefficients resulted from the profit 
margin and earnings retention variables.  Change in profit margin represents a 300 percent 
decrease in coefficient magnitude, compared to all cooperatives. The year over year change in 
earnings retention has a coefficient that is 66 percent larger than all cooperatives.  Albeit small 
and statistically insignificant, the magnitude differences between low sales cooperatives and all 
cooperatives are thought-provoking. 
High sales cooperatives recognize a 7 percent lower change in leverage coefficient and a 
14 percent lower change in operating efficiency coefficient, when comparing to all cooperatives.  
Lower change in leverage and operating efficiency coefficients suggests that high sales 
cooperatives use these growth levers to a lesser degree than all cooperatives to overcome growth.  
There is no difference in the change in profit margin coefficients of all cooperatives and high 
sales cooperatives.  And, the change in earnings retention is greater than 1500 percent larger in 
magnitude for high sales cooperatives than it is for all cooperatives.  A decreased dependency on 
leverage and operating efficiency and an increased dependency on earnings retention highlights 
that high sales cooperatives are operating with a different growth ideology. 
Analyzing the cooperatives based on regional location was motivated by volume 
differences of cooperatives inside the corn belt.  SUR model Given the corn belt partially 
encompasses some states and wholly encompasses others, along with the nature of the data 
segregated by state, cooperatives in Iowa, Illinois, or Indiana makeup the subset henceforth 
referred to as corn belt cooperatives.  Those cooperatives that are not located in either of the 
three listed states are henceforth referred to as not in the corn belt cooperatives.  Subset 
comparison to the aggregate dataset provides insights on how a subset uses their growth levers to 
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overcome a challenge.  The dummy variable, corn, takes a value of one if the cooperative is 
located in the corn belt, otherwise, zero.   
Looking to table 5-4, for all cooperatives the year over year change in leverage 
coefficient is 0.7088, which indicates that the SGC will change 0.7088 as much as leverage does. 
Decreasing leverage will lead to a decrease in the SGC; increasing leverage leads to an increase 
in the SGC.  Change in operating efficiency, with a value of 0.6004, is the secondary positive 
and significant key variable contributing to the SGC.  The change in profit margin’s coefficient 
is significant and positive, however at a low magnitude, given its 0.0001 value is 6,000 times 
smaller than the next smallest coefficient.  And, the change in earnings retention coefficient is 
insignificant in all subsets shown in table 5-3 and negative and small in magnitude, -.0002, for 
all cooperatives. 
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Table 5-4 Seemingly Unrelated Regression Model Results based on Location for years 
1996-2014 
All cooperatives in the 
data set (% of total)
Cooperatives not in 
the Corn Belt 
(67.26%)
Cooperatives in the 
Corn Belt (32.74%)
obs. 2911 1957 954
Dependent Variable: Operating Efficiency
lagged_OE 0.9083**(0.0071) 0.9268**(0.0078) 0.8483**(0.0153)
SGC 1.7517**(0.0640) 1.7674**(0.0719) 1.6358**(0.1291)
Corn 0.0467(0.0306)
intercept 0.2524**(0.0256) 0.2033**(0.0264) 0.4827**(0.0545)
r^2 0.7477 0.7945 0.6046
Dependent Variable: Leverage
lagged Leverage 0.8073**(0.0096) 0.8449**(0.0105) 0.6843**(0.0196)
SGC 0.8872**(0.0564) 0.7572**(0.0610) 1.2936**(0.1157)
Corn 0.0185(0.0272)
intercept 0.4248**(0.0256) 0.3423**(0.0263) 0.7348**(0.0517)
r^2 0.5039 0.616 0.2867
Dependent Variable: Earnings Retention
lagged_ER 0.0083(0.0184) -0.0029(0.0224) 0.3529**(0.0273)
SGC -0.0815(0.0555) -0.1406(0.0801) 0.0450(0.0270)
Corn 0.0483(0.0267)
intercept 0.7291**(0.0204) 0.7361**(0.0247) 0.5108**(0.0221)
r^2 0.0019 0.0012 0.156
Dependent Variable: Profit Margin
lagged_PM 0.6032**(0.0144) 0.6177**(0.0174) 0.4899**(0.0257)
SGC -0.0221**(0.0015) -0.0254**(0.0020) -0.0153**(0.0019)
Corn -0.0025**(0.0007)
intercept 0.0096**(0.0005) 0.0092**(0.0006) 0.0093**(0.0006)
r^2 0.4355 0.4458 0.3383
Dependent Variable: SGC
Chg_Lev 0.7088**(0.0123) 0.7837**(0.0147) 0.5965**(0.0207)
Chg_OE 0.6004**(0.0092) 0.6996**(0.0110) 0.4606**(0.0154)
Chg_PM 0.0001**(0.0011) 0.0000 (0.0003) 0.0001**(0.0030)
Chg_ER -0.0002 (0.0007) -0.0003 (0.0007) 0.0015 (0.0025)
Corn -0.0237**(0.0054)
intercept -0.0497**(0.0031) -0.0537**(0.0029) -0.0631**(0.0050)
r^2 0.6271 0.7010 0.5230
note: ** denotes significance to the 5%  level
note: standard error in parenthese
note: Corn is equal to 1 if the cooperative is located in the corn belt, otherwise zero
  
Source: CoBank Risk Analyst Data 
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The dummy variable for corn belt cooperatives has a significant negative coefficient of -
0.0237.  This indicates that corn belt cooperatives achieve 2 percent lower SGC values than their 
counterpart non-corn belt cooperatives.  
Comparing corn belt cooperatives to all cooperatives shows differences.  The change in 
leverage coefficient is 10 percent higher for corn belt cooperatives.  Also, the change in 
operating efficiency has a 16 percent higher coefficient magnitude than all cooperatives.  Though 
insignificant, a 100 percent decrease in the change in profit margin coefficient from all 
cooperatives to corn belt cooperatives suggests that profit margin is not adjusted to overcome 
growth challenges.  Change in earnings retention coefficient shows a marked decrease of 50 
percent when comparing all cooperatives to corn belt cooperatives.  This indicates that the 
earnings retention growth lever is not used to overcome growth challenges.   
Looking to the cooperatives not located in the corn belt, the change in leverage 
coefficient is 16 percent smaller in magnitude than for all cooperatives. Change in operating 
efficiency for cooperatives not in the corn belt shows a large decrease, 23 percent, when 
comparing to all cooperatives.  Cooperatives not located in the corn belt have a coefficient that is 
unchanged from that of all cooperatives for the year over year change in profit margin.  Across 
all subsets, the largest difference from subset to aggregate cooperatives exists in the comparison 
of corn belt cooperatives and all cooperatives while examining year over year change in earnings 
retention.  While insignificant, non-corn belt cooperatives have an increase in the coefficient of 
earnings retention by 850 percent when compared to all cooperatives.  The increase in 
coefficient indicates that cooperatives not located in the corn belt may manipulate their earnings 
retention rate to overcome a growth challenge to a greater degree than all cooperatives.  
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Comparing cooperatives based on farm supply sales provides intuitive and interesting 
results.   The cooperatives that generate a majority of sales through farm supply sales are 
hereafter referred to as majority farm supply cooperatives.  And cooperatives which generate a 
minority of sales through farm supply sales will be hereafter referred to as minority farm supply 
cooperatives.  Majority and minority farm supply cooperatives are individually compared to all 
cooperatives to distinguish differences.   A majority farm supply cooperative dummy variable 
was inserted as Supply-coop.  This dummy variable takes a value of one if the cooperative is 
majority farm supply, otherwise zero.  
Looking to table 5-5, all cooperatives’ year over year change in leverage has a positive 
significant coefficient.    This indicates that a change in leverage leads to a 0.71 change in the 
SGC.  The change in operating efficiency is another key growth lever that is significant and 
positively effects the SGC.  The change in profit margin coefficient is a positive and significant 
coefficient, however, the magnitude reflects less than one percent of the operating efficiency or 
leverage magnitudes.   Hence, operating efficiency and leverage represent the largest growth 
lever coefficients positively affecting the SGC.  Earnings retention year over year changes 
negatively affect the SGC, this result for all cooperatives is insignificant, however, lends 
interesting implications nonetheless.   
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Table 5-5 Seemingly Unrelated Regression Model Results based on Farm Supply Sales for 
years 1996-2014 
All cooperatives in the 
data set (% of total)
Cooperatives with greater 
than 50% of sales from 
farm supply sales (31.5%)
Cooperatives with 0-50% 
of sales from farm supply 
sales (68.6%)
Obs. 2911 914 1997
Dependent Variable: Operating Efficiency
lagged_OE 0.90199** (0.00726) 0.94542** (0.01109) 0.89664** (0.00888)
SGC 1.736911** (0.06404) 1.67630** (0.06350) 1.7454** (0.08753)
Supply -0.05460 (0.03136)
Intercept 0.30250** (0.02804) 0.14816** (0.02829) 0.31810** (0.03352)
R^2 0.7483 0.7564 0.7304
Dependent Variable: Leverage
lagged Leverage 0.79643** (0.00979) 0.90507** (0.01170) 0.77567** (0.01225)
SGC 0.88504** (0.05619) 0.56404** (0.05374) 1.04514** (0.07644)
Supply -0.08243** (0.02774)
Intercept 0.48036** (0.02758) 0.18950** (0.02448) 0.53161** (0.03366)
R^2 0.5080 0.7155 0.4470
Dependent Variable: Earnings Retention
lagged_ER 0.00901 (0.01839) 0.14148** (0.03245) -0.02340 (0.02218)
SGC -0.08058 (0.05557) 0.04847  (0.08135) -0.12411* (0.07120)
Supply -0.02757 (0.02698)
Intercept 0.75303** (0.02055) 0.63144** (0.02966) 0.77676** (0.02344)
R^2 0.0011 0.0209 0.0025
Dependent Variable: Profit Margin
lagged_PM 0.58347** (0.01453) 0.61849** (0.02428) 0.48915** (0.01848)
SGC -0.02174** (0.00150) -0.04427**(0.00370) -0.01357** (0.00138)
Supply 0 .00573** (0.00075)
Intercept 0.00739** (0.00049) 0.01146** (0.00944) 0.00926** (0.00046)
R^2 0.4441 0.5065 0.3019
Dependent Variable: SGC
Chg_Lev 0.71017** (0.01235) 0.94362** (0.02353) 0.66152** (0.01406)
Chg_OE 0.60083** (0.00919) 0.89225** (0.01701) 0.54034** (0.01054)
Chg_PM 0.00006** (0.00003) -0.00004 (0.00028) 0.00007** (0.00003)
Chg_ER -0.00031 (0.00074) -0.00289 (0.00156) -0.00015(0.00083)
Supply 0.02089** (0.00552)
Intercept -0.06408** (0.00316) -0.04952** (0.00355) -0.06006 (0.00331)
R^2 0.6265 0.7571 0.6070
note: standard error in parentheses
note: ** denotes significance to the 5%  level
note: Supply_coop is a dummy variable equalling 1 if the cooperative receives a majority of sales from farm 
supply sales  
Source: CoBank Risk Analyst Data 
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Interestingly, the supply dummy variable indicates a significant two percent increase in 
SGC if the cooperative is a majority farm supply cooperative.  The dummy variable results 
designate that majority farm supply cooperatives are prone to elevated growth challenges.  By 
definition, this indicates that majority farm supply cooperatives have actual sales that outpace the 
SGR. 
Comparing majority farm supply cooperatives to all cooperatives indicates that, when 
significant, majority farm supply cooperatives’ coefficients are larger than the aggregate 
cooperative dataset.  The change in leverage coefficient is positive and significant for majority 
farm supply cooperatives and represents a 33 percent increase over all cooperatives.  Likewise, 
the majority farm supply cooperative’s change in operating efficiency coefficient is significant 
and positive and shows a 48.5 percent increase when comparing to all cooperatives.   
Looking to the minority farm supply cooperatives, the change in leverage, operating 
efficiency and profit margin are each significant and positive coefficient.  The change in 
leverage’s coefficient is 6.8 percent lower than it is for all cooperatives.  Similarly, change in 
operating efficiency coefficient is reduced by 10 percent when comparing to all cooperatives.  
For minority farm supply cooperatives, the year over year change in profit margin is a 16 percent 
larger driver of the SGC than it is for all cooperatives.  While the change in earnings retention 
for minority farm supply cooperatives is not a significant variable, its coefficient is 51 percent 
larger than all cooperatives’, though it is also a negative coefficient.   
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Chapter 6 - Conclusions 
Using CoBank Risk Analyst panel data of 162 cooperatives across 19 years, the SGR and 
SGC was calculated for aggregate cooperatives as well as smaller subsets.  The initial empirical 
study determined the affect that each growth lever had on the SGR—as a growth lever fluctuates, 
the SGR also fluctuates by a percentage of the initial change.  Using the SUR model, it was 
deduced how growth lever adjustments affect the SGC and enables cooperative directors to 
efficiently pull levers to overcome a growth challenge.   
Changes to the SGC could result from either an increased SGR or decreased annual sales.  
Holding inventory prices constant, decreased annual sales equates to decreased market share for 
a cooperative.  Although decreasing sales may be needed for a strategic restructuring of the 
business, cooperatives under normal operations should not strive for reduced sales.  Changing 
the SGR is needed to change the SGC, holding year over year annual revenue growth constant.   
 In the SUR model, low sales cooperatives depend most on leverage and operating 
efficiency.  However, the low sales cooperative subset has a 23 percent higher coefficient for 
operating efficiency, compared to all cooperatives. Only a 6 percent higher coefficient exists for 
the change in leverage and its effect on SGC.  Thus, compared to all farmer cooperatives, 
operating efficiency is much more important for low sales cooperatives when overcoming a 
growth challenge. 
Econometric analysis results indicate for two out of three comparisons, the higher growth 
subset also achieves a lower growth challenge.  Corn belt and high sales cooperatives attain both 
higher sustainable growth as well as a lower growth challenge for the study period.  The corn 
belt cooperatives generated a 16.7 percent higher SGR and a 105 percent lower SGC, when 
compared to non-corn belt cooperatives during the study period.  And, the high sales 
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cooperatives realized a 43 percent higher SGR and a 236 percent lower SGC when compared to 
low sales cooperatives.  This indicates that the high growth cooperatives are not growing fast 
enough and potentially not capturing full value for their owners.  And, the lower growth subsets, 
the non-corn belt and low sales cooperatives, achieve lower SGR and higher SGC during the 
study.  Implying that the low sales cooperatives are growing faster than sustainable, requiring 
additional financing.   
The sustainable growth rate (SGR) model provides a framework for cooperative directors 
and managers to discuss growth of the cooperative. If actual growth exceeds what is sustainable, 
then the discussion needs to focus on acquiring outside capital to fund the growth. Or, if actual 
growth is slower than what is sustainable, then the discussion should center around why is the 
co-op not growing fast enough.  
In this study, the financials of 162 grain and farm supply cooperatives in 23 states were 
analyzed focusing on growth and methods of growth.  Using the SGC as a measure for rate of 
growth relative to sustainable rate, those cooperatives with a positive SGC may be outstripping 
their resources, seeking outside capital, and growing unsustainably.   
The term growing broke refers to a business that grows annual revenues faster than the 
capital base able to produce the sales.  This could mean that the business is unable to purchase 
enough trucks to deliver the sold product in a timely fashion, if at all.  In another example, a 
company that grows too quick may not have the cash on hand to meet the day to day needs of 
payroll and cost of goods sold while waiting on the customer base to remit payment in a timely 
manner.   
Two pairs of subsets exhibited both higher SGR and lower SGC values for one of the two 
pairs.  First, the corn belt and non-corn belt cooperative subset comparison showed that corn belt 
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cooperatives realized a 16.7 percent higher SGR as well as a 105 percent lower SGC, relative to 
non-corn belt cooperatives.  Due to both cooperative regional subsets maintaining a negative 
SGC, neither would be classified as growing broke, however, the corn belt cooperatives are 
growing at a faster rate as well as accumulating more capital than non-corn belt cooperatives. 
The next subset paring that exhibits this phenomenon, low and high sales cooperatives, 
do so in a slightly different manner.  The high sales cooperatives, those with greater than $50 
million in annual sales, experienced a 43 percent higher SGR and a 236 percent lower SGC, 
relative to low sales cooperatives.  These low sales cooperatives, those with annual sales of less 
than $50 million, have a positive SGC that is near 40 percent of their SGR, which would suggest 
that these cooperatives are growing faster than sustainable.  The high sales cooperatives 
maintained a negative SGC value indicating that their growth, although rapid, could be quicker.  
Due to the low sales cooperatives exhibiting a positive SGC and the lowest SGR of all subsets, 
these cooperatives are growing broke in the evolving and changing marketplace of today.    
A deeper growth discussion is possible when examining the four levers of growth. These 
levers show how key financial ratios are connected and affect a cooperative’s SGR. Using the 
empirical results most resembling their cooperative, directors can make growth and financial 
lever decisions.  The subsets were created to better enable application of the results directly to 
cooperatives.  Given the financial metrics table in chapter 4, a director can compare their 
cooperative’s metrics with the subset or aggregate data to determine the cooperative’s standing 
and differences from average.   
Through time, cooperative directors and boards have the ability to react to economic 
challenges by increasing the operating efficiency and leverage. But during boom times, 
decreasing this leverage and increasing the profit margin are key focal points. While significant 
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competition limits directors and management’s ability to lift profit margins to drive growth, 
profitability must occur, or else growth will turn negative.  
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